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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
---oooOooo---
SHIRLEY W, ADAMS 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
Case No. 
CHARLES W. ADAMS 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
---oooOooo---
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF APPELLANT 
---oooOooo---
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff-Appellant pursuant 
to the continuing jurisdiction of the Court in a domestic matter, 
based on an Order to Show Cause issued by the Trial Court as to why 
the Defendant-Respondent should not be ordered to pay alimony which 
has accrued and remains unpaid. Defendant-Respondent objected to 
the Order to Show Cause, requested that the Trial Court terminate 
the Defendant-Respondent's alimony obligation and find that Plaintiff-
Appellant was estopped from claiming any past due alimony. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court, in a memorandum decision held that Plaintiff-
~ppellant was estopped from claiming alimony against the Defendant-
?espondent except as to any arrearages which had accull'.ulated up to 
~arch 1972 and for six months thereafter and that the decree was to 
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be modified to reduce alimony to the sum of $1.00 per year. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant prays that the judgment of the Trial 
Court be reversed and that this Court direct the Trial Court to 
enter its order awarding the back due alimony together with intereo 
·r 
thereon, to restore the alimony obligation to its former level and' 
to award Plaintiff-Appellant reasonable attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on May 13, 1954 and divorced on 
March 27, 1970 with the divorce becoming final three months there-
after. The Divorce Decree was modified on the 16th of June, 1970,' 
the 17th of January, 1972 and again at the request of Defendant-
Respondent on March 31, 1972. The last modification of the decree 
awarded custody of the minor children of the parties to the Defen-
dant-Respondent and terminated the Defendant-Respondent's child 
support obligation. 
From the date the decree was last modified in Barch 1972 unti: 
the time this action was brought in November 1977, the Defendant-
Respondent never paid any alimony except for the sum of $707.50 
which is not a part of this appeal. (T., 5) It is undisputed that 
the Plaintiff-Appellant did not claim alimony or make any represe~· 
tations whatever to Defendant-Respondent with regard to the paymen: 
of alimony during that same period of time. (T.,l2,13,14) 
The Trial Court's finding that a substantial change of cir-
cumstances had occurred since the date of the last modification 
of the decree was based on the fact that Plaintiff-Appellant no 
-2-
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longer has custody of the minor children and has no obligation 
to support them. (T ,25) 
ARGUMENT. 
POINT ONE 
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BE RAISED AS A 
DEFENSE TO PAYMENT OF ALIMONY WHEN THE ONLY RE-
LIANCE BY THE HUSBAND IS UPON THE WIFE'S SILENCE 
OR FAILURE TO PURSUE HER CLAIM. 
Plaintiff-Appellant assigns as error the statement of the 
Trial Court in its Findings of Fact No. 5, that: 
"Plaintiff knew or should have known ••• that the 
Defendant did not recognize any obligation to pay 
alimony, and at that time Plaintiff had a duty to 
inform Defendant that she claimed alimony .•• " 
Plaintiff-Appellant also assigns as error the Trial Court's Finding 
of Fact No. 6 in its entirety and further asserts that not only is 
the doctrine of estoppel improperly applied by the Trial Court but 
that the arbitrary choice of six months as a -period at which time 
the estoppel would begin to run has no basis in law or in fact. 
The Trial Court has created a duty which was nonexistent and 
which is directly contrary to previous holdings of this Court. In 
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144 P2d 528, 531 (1943) this 
Court stated that in order for the doctrine of estoppel to be 
raised successfully as a defense against the payment of alimony, 
the Defendant must have shown more than mere inaction or delay. 
"In this case we have searched the record in vain 
for any evidence which would even tend to show 
that plaintiff misled defendant to his detriment, 
-3-
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or in any other way did anything to injure defen-
dant, make it difficult or impossible for him to 
c~mply with the order of the court, or persuaded 
h~m not to apply to the court for reduction of 
the award. The evidence adduced to the effect 
that on the few occassions when he visited the 
children and their mother in California, the 
plaintiff did not harass him for payment or-
arrearages, ~s not sufficient .•. " (emphasis added) 
This court has uniformly held that there must be more than 
mere silence over a period of time in order to raise an estoppel 
which would protect the husband where a divorce decree orders 
the payment of child support and alimony. French v. Johnson, 
16 Utah 2d. 360, 401 P2d 315 (1965) is A FORTIORI to the instant 
case. The facts as stated by this Court are that: 
"On March 18, 1954, Johnson was ordered to 
pay support money to his former wife for their 
child. He defaulted, and in February, 1964, 
10 years later, plaintiff brought proceedings 
against him. 
The district court relieved defendant of past 
payments because the plaintiff had been dilatory 
in requesting payments and producing her forward-
ing addresses to defendant. 
Johnson defends by asserting estoppel or laches. 
Defendant relied on his wife's silence." 
Even though ten years had elapsed and Plaintiff may not have 
produced her forwarding address to the Defendant this Court 
held that: 
"The facts show no representations, either 
explicit or implicit, by plaintiff to defendant 
with respect to discontinuation of payments . 
Mere silence over a period of time will not ralse 
as estoppel. .. " (Id. p. 315) 
In Baggs v. Andersen, 528 P2d 141, 143-144 (1974) the 
holding of French v. Johnson, supra. was reaffirmed and the 
duty of the Defendant-Respondent to prove more than mere sile~' 
-4-
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or delay was again emphasized. 
"An essential requirement is that there must 
be some conduct of the obligee (plaintiff} , wh1ch 
reasonabl~ induces the obligor (defendant) to rely 
thereon and make some substantial change in his 
pos1t1on to his detriment •.. This requirement 
is not satisfied by the mere fact that he int'lulged 
in the pleasant and emphoric assumption that he 
would not have to meet his obligations ..• Like-
wise, the mere passage of time, or the failure of 
a creditor (plaintiff£) to bedevil the debtor for 
payment does not create an estoppel. (emphasis added) 
The Trial Court's decision flies in the face of this Court's 
previous rulings on the same subject. Affirmation of the Trial 
Court's decision would require this court to reverse itself in 
each of the previously cited cases. It would create a new 
and separate duty to aggressively pursue alimony and child support 
or risk losing those vested rights. It would shift the duty to 
collect support on the Plaintiff-Appellant. 
This court should reverse the Trial Court's ruling and direct 
that judgment be granted in favor of Plaintiff-Appellant and 
against Defendant-Respondent in the amounts prayed for at the 
hearing before the Trial Court. 
POINT II 
THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT 
BE ALLOWED TO PROTECT A PERSON FROM HIS OWN 
MISTAKE OR INADVERTANCE. 
It is an equitable principle that where one of two innocent 
parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred 
must bear it. Pompton twp. v Cooper Union, 101 u.s. 196 (1879), 
Orleans v. Platt, 99 U.S. 676 (1878), Magee v. Manhattan L. Ins. 
Co., 92 c.s. 93 (1875), Gray v. Jacobsen, 56 App. DC 353, 13 F2d 
-5-
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959 (1926), Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Gerber, 526 P2d 1121 
( 197 4) , Hanson v. Beehive Sec. Co., 14 Utah 2d 157, 3 80 P2d 66 (I 
The Defendant-Respondent was present in court with his 
attorney when the decree was last modified. (T-10) The Plaintif 
appellant was not present nor represented by counsel. (T-10) De!· 
endant-Respondent secured custody of his children and TTIOdified th
1 
decree to eliminate his duty to pay child support. (T-14) Why 
Defendant-Respondent neglected, omitted, or refused to further 
modify the decree with regard to alimony is a rna tter of conjectur; 
Whatever the reasons for Defendant-Respondent's failure to applp 
the court for a modification of alimony, there is no justificatic: 
which would allow him to invoke an equitable doctrine to remedy 
or change his own error, inadvertance, or perhaps previous in ten-
tion. 
The record clearly demonstrates that even if the Defendant· 
Respondent in good faith believes that his alimony obligation 
was terminated and therefore was an innocent party, nevertheless 
it was through his agency that the loss occurred. The Defendant· 
Respondent understood his burden to proceed in order to obtain 
custody of his children and in order to relieve himself of a 
duty to pay child support. He retained counsel and bore the 1~ 
· d · th t b d He must have or shouli expenses inc~ ent to meet~ng a ur en. 
have known that the burden to further modify the decree regardin' 
alimony payments was also his burden. Conversely, Plaintiff-
Appellant could not have been the party through whose agency t;.E 
d b h not even Present a t the time wh~ loss occurre ecause s e was 
or the place where,the decree was modified and the record is ck 
-6-
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and undisputed that she made no representation either explicit or 
implicit to the Defendant-Respondent with respect to discontinua-
tion of payments. 
This court should order that Defendant-Respondent must bear any 
loss created by his own mistake or inadvertance. 
POINT III 
ALIMONY AWARDS MAY NOT BE RETROACTIVELY MODIFIED. 
The method by which a party may be relieved of a duty to 
pay support imposed by a divorce decree has been clearly defined. 
There is no discretion left to attempt an alternate method. Utah 
Code Ann. §30-3-5 (1953) vests continuing jurisdiction in the 
District Court of Utah: 
" ..... to make such subsequent changes or new 
orders with respect to the maintenance and 
support of the parties .•. as shall be reasonable 
and necessary ... " 
Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 216, 198 P2d 233, 235-236 (1948) 
emphasizes the absolute duty to apply to the court for relief from 
an order of support in a divorce decree . 
... no discretion is left to a divorced husband, 
to determine whether he should or w~ll comply 
with an alimon~ decree. So lo~g as such dec7ee 
stands, it ~s ~ncumbent upon h~m to comply w~th 
it, or at least to exercise every reasonable 
effort to comply with it. If because of change 
in the circumstances of the parties it appears 
that the decree is inequitable, or impossible to 
comply with, he may petition for modification. 
But so long as that decree stands, the husband 
must comply wLth Lt, or make every reasonable 
effort to do so, and this is true regardless of 
how the financial situation of his former wife 
may have improved. (Emphasis added} 
-7-
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The Trial Court's ruling creates an alternate method of 
modifying a divorce decree other than that prescribed by statute 
and it has the effect of retroactively modifying the divorce 
decree in this case. Tnis is a result which this court has 
specifically forbidden in Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P2d 1077, 1079 
(1977) 
In this jurisdiction alimony and support pay-
ments become unalterable debts as they accrue; 
therefore, a periodic installment cannot be 
changed or modified after the installments 
have become due .•• (emphasis added) 
In Larsen v. Larsen Id. this court again reaffirmed the metb 
by which a decree can be modified. The parties were free to make 
application to the Court for a changed circumstances hearing. 
This court refused to let the parties alter the decree by ~Y 
other method. 
The Trial Court has invoked an equitable doctrine to retro-
actively modify a divorce decree, a result specifically forbidder. 
by this court, thereby protecting Defendant-Respondent from his 
own mistake or inadvertance. Such an application of equity is 
itself inequitable and should not be allowed. 
POINT IV 
IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY A REDUCTION OF ALIMONY, THE 
MOVING PARTY MUST PROVE CHANGED CONDITIONS ARISING 
SINCE THE LAST MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE. 
In Hampton v. Hampton, 86 Utah 570, 47 P2d 419, 420 (19531 
this court stated: 
"It is well settled in this court that in order 
to secure a change in a decree for alimony the 
moving party must allege and prove changed con-
ditions arising since the entry of the decree 
which require, under rule of equity and JUSt~ce, 
-8-
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a change in the decree, Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 
Utah, 261, 225 P. 76; Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 
Utah, 261, 236 P. 457. 11 (emphasis added) 
This statement was reaffirmed in Gardner v. Gardner, 111 Utah 286, 
177 P2d 743 (1947) and again in Osmus v. Osmus supra. 
The Trial Court used as its basis for finding a substantial 
change in circumstances the fact that Plaintiff-Appellant no longer 
had custody of the children and had no oligations for them (T.25) 
The children of the parties were given to the Defendant-Respondent 
at the time the decree was last modified in March of 1972. That 
modification left the alimony provision intact. Since the Trial 
Court must base its decision upon changed circumstances arising 
since the entry of the decree it cannot use the fact that Plaintiff-
Appellant does not have custody of the children as a basis for 
that modification. 
The change in custody and therefore the change in circumstances 
used by the Trial Court as a basis for modifying the decree was 
created by the last modification of the decree. Plaintiff-Appellant 
submits that the Court must find a substantial change of circum-
stances excluding the fact that she no longer has custody of the 
children of the parties, and that there was no showing at the hearing 
below which would justify alimony being reduced to $1.00 per year. 
Unless and until Defendant-Respondent can allege and prove a sub-
stantial change of circumstances arising since the last modification 
of the decree in this case, the alimony award must remain undisturbed 
and at its former level. 
-9-
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POINT V 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S 
FEES BOTH ON THE APPEAL AND AT THE TRIAL BELOW. 
The Trial Court's decision to estop Plaintiff-Appellant 
from collecting past due alimony was patently erroneous. There 
was no evidence of any conduct on her part which would raise an ! 
I 
estoppel. Both parties agree that Plaintiff-Appellant was silent! 
with regard to her claims for alimony and that she made no repre· 
sentations implicit or explicit to Defendant-Respondent which 
would or could have induced him to rely to his detriment thereor.. 
The well established principals of equity provide that where one 
of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the 
loss occurred must bear it. The Trial Court's decision ignores 
the law clearly stated in Openshaw V'.' Openshaw supra., French v, 
Johnson supra., and Baggs v. Andersen supra. 
This court has held in Bates v. Bates, 560 P2d 706 (1977) 
that when a party is compelled to appeal a patently erroneous 
order, the party is entitled to attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The law is well settled that mere silence on the part oft: 
wife will not raise an estoppel which will bar her claim for u: 
paid alimony. 
Neither should the doctrineof estoppel be used as a tool 
to protect the party from his own mistake, inadvertance, or prE' 
vious intention. 
Divorce decrees can not be retroactively modified. 
In order to secure a change in an alimony award, the movl: 
party must plead and prove a material change in circumstances 
-10-
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arising since the last modification of the divorce decree. 
Attorney's fees are ~llowable when a party is compelled to 
appeal from a patently erroneous order. 
For the foregoing reasons Appellant requests this Court to 
reverse the decision of the Trial Court and instruct it to 
enter the appropriate order. 
Respectfully submitted this --------day of April, 1978. 
c. J. Jauss~ 
of the firm of 
Mulliner, McCullough & Jaussi 
424 South State Street 
Orem, UT 84057 
Attorney's for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Brief of Plain-
tiff-Appellant by delivering two copies thereof, to the office 
Gary D. Stott, attorney for Defendant-Respondent, 350 East Center, 
Provo, Utah 84601 this day of April, 1978. 
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